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COMMENT 
WHAT IS GOOD FOR THE MARKET, 
CAN BE BAD FOR THE HEALTH: 
EMISSIONS TRADING UNDER 




In his February 11, 1994 Executive Order, "Federal Action 
to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and 
Low-Income Populations," President William Jefferson Clinton 
demonstrated his commitment to environmental justice. 1 This 
Order commanded that all federal agencies factor environ-
mental justice into their long term goals.2 The 1994 Order, 
which specifically seeks to combat environmental racism, is the 
federal government's response to the environmental justice 
1. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (Feb. 11, 1994), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 4321 (West 1998). "[Elach Federal agency shall make achieving environmental 
justice part of its mission by identifying and addressing ... disproportionately high and 
adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities 
on minority population and low-income populations in the United States ... ." [d. § 
4321. 
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movement, an outgrowth of the civil rights and broader envi-
ronmental movements that developed in the 1960s and 1970s.3 
While environmental racism is not a new phenomenon, only 
recently has it been addressed as a separate issue within envi-
ronmentallaw.4 Rather than focusing solely on environmental 
issues, such as global warming or the rainforests, environ-
mental justice advocates focus specifically on the clispropor-
tionate impact of environmental hazards on minorities. 5 
While civil rights activists struggled to fmd their role in the 
environmental justice movement, activists in the larger envi-
ronmental community have also been in conflict over their role. 
Traditional environmentalists have relied on "rules and orders 
to control pollution, toxic wastes [and] chemical hazards."6 
Currently, the states and the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) are moving toward market-based incentive sys-
tems. Proponents of the market-based incentive system claim 
these programs give industry greater flexibility and achieve 
environmental protection less expensively without violating 
federal standards. Rather than proscribing the means by 
which sources are to meet their pollution control requirements, 
3. See Omar Saleem, Overcoming Environmental Discrimination: The Need For 
A Disparate Impact Test and Improved Notice Requirements In Facility Siting 
Decisions, 19 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 211, 216 (1994) (quoting Robert Bullard, The Threat 
of Environmental Racism, 7 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 23 (1993)). Environmental 
racism is defmed as "any policy, practice, or directive ... that differentially affects or 
disadvantages (whether intended or unintended) individuals, groups, or communities 
based on race or color [as well as) exclusionary and restrictive practices that limit 
participation by people of color in decision·making boards, commissions, and regulating 
bodies." Id. 
4. See Alice Kaswan, Article, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between 
Environmental Laws and "Justice", 47 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 225 (1997) (discusses a plan 
for uniting environmental goals with social justice goals). See also infra notes 10·32 
and accompanying text for discussion of the origins of the environmental justice 
movement. 
5. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1440 (Merriam·Webster, 
Inc. 1986). The term "minority" or "minority group" is defmed as "a group differing 
from the predominant section of a larger group in one or more characteristics (as ethnic 
background ... ) and as a result often subjected to differential treatment and esp[cially) 
discrimination." Id. 
6. See generally Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through 
Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153 (1988) (discusses the transformation 
from the command and control system to the market·based incentive programs). 
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market-based incentive systems often allow polluters to buy 
and sell pollution like a commodity. For example, the Los An-
geles area, noted for having the most polluted air in the coun-
try, has set the standard for market-based incentive systems 
through its Regional Clean Air Incentives Market program. 
The current debate in environmental circles pits these market-
based incentive programs, deemed more efficient by industry, 
against the traditional command and control system. 
In Section II, this Comment examines the development of 
both the environmental justice movement and the traditional 
environmental movement. Section II also describes the South 
Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) and its ap-
plication of a market-based incentive program known as "emis-
sions trading." This section explains SCAQMD's Old-Vehicle 
Scrapping Rule 1610 (Rule 1610) and Rule 1610's failure to ad-
dress environmental justice issues. Section III examines the 
disparate effects of the program on minority communities. Sec-
tion IV critiques the way in which oil companies were permit-
ted to use Rule 1610 and how their use resulted in such dispa-
rate effects. Finally, Section V proposes that emissions trades 
be more closely monitored and that environmental justice be 
the primary factor in the environmental regulation decision-
making processes. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The environmental justice movement grew out of many civil 
rights activists' awareness that minority and low-income com-
munities were consistently burdened with toxic environments. 7 
During the same time period in which the environmental jus-
tice movement was formed, environmental law as a whole be-
gan to experiment with market-based incentive programs in-
7. See United Church of Christ Commission For Racial Justice, Toxic Wastes and 
Race in the United States: A National Report on the Racial and Socio-Economic 
Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites (1987). The Commission 
for Racial Justice is the racial agency of the United Church of Christ which fights for 
the rights of African American and other racial minorities. See id at ix. The study 
reports that "lbllacks are disproportionately burdened by environmental problems 
because they are more likely to hold industrial jobs where chemical processing or 
manufacturing poses health risks." Id. at 2. 
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stead of following the traditional command and control system. 
After numerous complaints from industry regarding the com-
mand and control system, federal and state environmental 
agencies created newer, more flexible standards. 8 This trans-
formation to a market-based environmental protection scheme 
allowed industry more control in implementing pollution pre-
vention and in decreasing their economic burdens.9 However, it 
has been minorities and low-income people who have remained 
overburdened with toxic hazards and whom environmental jus-
tice advocates have sought to protect under the existing civil 
rights laws. 
A. THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT'S ORIGINS 
In the late 1960s, as the civil rights movement continued to 
break down many of the racial barriers previously restricting 
Mrican Americans and other minorities from equal access to 
employment and educational opportunities, the environmental 
justice movement developed.lO In 1967, an eight year old Afri-
can American girl drowned at a garbage dump next to an ele-
mentary school and city park in a predominantly African 
American neighborhood. 11 The girl's drowning triggered riots 
among the Mrican American students at Texas Southern Uni-
versity.12 These riots demonstrated an early awareness by civil 
rights activists of environmental justice issues. 13 
8. See generally Stewart, supra note 6 (explains the conflicts between the 
command and control and the market-based incentive systems). 
9. See id. 
10. See Kaswan, supra note 4, at 221 (discusses the emergence of the 
environmental justice movement). 
11. See Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice For All: It's the Right Thing To 
Do, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 281, 284 (1994) (quoting ROBERT D. BULLARD, INVISIBLE 
HOUSTON: THE BLACK EXPERIENCE IN BOOM AND BUST 110 (1987». The author 
provides the reader with what he believes are the defining events that led to the 
creation of the movement. He cites the events subsequent to an Mrican American girl 
drowning in a Houston, Texas dumpsite; the siting of a PCB landfill in a minority 
neighborhood in North Carolina; and the 1991 First National People of Color 
Environmental Leadership Summit. See id. 
12. See id. at 284. 
13. See id. at 285. The author discusses how Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. traveled 
to Memphis, Tennessee on a mission to improve working conditions for African 
American garbage workers. See id. 
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While the civil rights movement focused primarily on 
achieving equal opportunity and social status for Mrican 
Americans and other minorities, the child's drowning near 
Texas Southern University and the subsequent riots, as well as 
other related activism, served to cement the existence of the 
environmental justice movement. 14 Heightened awareness that 
minority and low-income people continued to live in unsafe and 
toxic environments, gave rise to the movement now known as 
environmental justice. 15 
The environmental justice movement progressed slowly 
during the 1970s because many ardent civil rights activists dis-
trusted the broader environmental movement. 16 In particular, 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peo-
ple (NAACP) viewed environmental causes with suspicion be-
cause members believed that environmentalists negatively im-
pacted minorities. 17 In 1978, the NAACP claimed thatenvi-
ronmental regulations hindered Mrican American socio-
economic progress because many environmental policies elimi-
nated jobs primarily held by Mrican Americans. 18 
Despite the initial activism of the 1960s, the slow progress 
in the 1970s delayed the environmental justice movement's rise 
to the national attention until 1982. At that time, citizens of 
Afton, Warren County, North Carolina protested the state's 
selection of their town as a Polychlorinated Biphenyl (PCB) 
landfill site. 19 North Carolina officials chose the poorest part of 
Warren County, which was eighty-five percent Mrican Ameri-
can, as the location to dump PCB-contaminated oil. 20 
14. See id. at 285-287. 
15. See id. at 285. 
16. See generally Edward Flattau, Our Environment Column, GANNETI' NEWS 
SERVICE, Nov. I, 1991, available in 1991 WL 5607311. 
17. See ill. The article reports that "in 1978, the NAACP released a policy paper 
denouncing energy conservation and anti-pollution regulations as barriers to blacks' 
socio-economic progress." [d. 
18. See ill. 
19. See Bullard, supra note 11, at 281. The North Carolina protest represented 
the first time environmental racism was recognized as different from other 
environmental issues. See ill. 
20. See ill. at 285. 
5
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For the fIrst time, environmental and civil rights activists, 
as well as labor and political leaders, joined together to oppose 
North Carolina's decision to build the toxic landfill. 21 Despite 
the protest, the state pursued the proposal. 22 The controversy 
surrounding the siting, however, compelled an investigation.23 
Outraged with North Carolina's site selection for the PCB land-
fill, the Chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus, Walter 
Fauntroy, and New Jersey Congressional Representative 
James J. Florio, requested that the United States General Ac-
counting Office (GAO) investigate the correlation between the 
siting of hazardous waste facilities and the racial and economic 
makeup of the communities with hazardous waste sites.24 In 
its subsequent 1983 report, the GAO found that in Region IV, 
comprised of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, 
North Carolina, South Carolina and Tennessee, "black people 
make up the m~ority of the population in three of the four 
communities ... where hazardous waste landfills are sited."25 
In addition, at least twenty-six percent of the population within 
each of these four communities fell below the poverty level. 26 
The protest to the Afton site and the GAO reMrt marked the 
21. See id. In this instance the community specifically opposed North Carolina, 
which marked the first time any state was challenged on environmental justice 
grounds. Hence, this event has been attributed to the birth of the environmental 
justice movement. See id. 
22. See Andrew Holmes and Larry B. Cowart, Environmental Racism: The New 
Liability for Industrial Site Selection, 21 AM. SOCIETY OF REAL ESTATE COUNSELORS, 
REAL ESTATE ISSUES, 1 (1996). This article discusses how industrial siting decisions 
complicate environmental justice issues since economic issues often come into conflict 
with public health issues. See id. 
23. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-83-168, Siting Of 
Hazardous Waste Landfills And Their Correlation With Racial And Economic Status Of 
Surrounding Communities (1983). The ensuing investigation resulted in the 
publication of this named report. See id. at 3. 
24. See Majority of Landfills in EPA Region N Located in Black Communities, 
GAO says, [Jan.-June) Env't Rep. (BNA) No.8, at 302 (June 24, 1983). Both men 
already believed that there was a correlation between the siting of these landfills and 
the racial and socio-economic makeup of the communities in which they were sited. 
See id. 
25. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAOIRCED-83-168, Siting Of Hazardous 
Waste Landfills And Their Correlation With Racial And Economic Status Of 
Surrounding Communities (1983). 
26. See id. at 1. 
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beginning of environmental justice awareness that would con-
tinue and grow throughout the 1980s.27 
In 1987, the United Church of Christ Commission for Racial 
Justice released its own report that found "three out of every 
five black and Hispanic Americans live in a community with 
uncontrolled toxic waste sites."28 In contrast to the GAO re-
port, the United Church of Christ study concluded that race, 
irrespective of socio-economic status, was the determinative 
factor in the siting of environmental hazards. 29 
Soon, other groups began to participate in the environ-
mental justice struggle. In 1988, the Gulf Coast Tenants Asso-
ciation and Greenpeace led a march down Louisiana's notorious 
"Cancer Alley," a polluted area of the Mississippi River which 
extends from Baton Rouge to New Orleans.so These organiza-
tions were outraged by the dense concentration of accumulated 
hazardous waste along the Mississippi River. 31 Although the 
27. See Marcia Coyle, When Movements Coalesce; Empowerment; Civil Rights 
Meets Environmental Rights, NAT'L L. J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S10. The article also refers 
to the United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice study and the march in 
the polluted "Cancer Alley" portion of the Mississippi River. See id. 
28. United Church of Christ Commission For Racial Justice, Toxic Wastes and 
Race in the United States: A National &port on the Racial and Socio·Economic 
Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites, 1987, at xiv. The report 
defines uncontrolled toxic waste sites as "closed and abandoned sites on the EPA's list 
of sites which pose a present and potential threat to human health and the 
environment." [d. at xii. 
29. See id. at xiii. The United Church of Christ For Racial Justice (UCC), along 
with a New York-based research firm, Public Data Access, Inc., conducted studies that 
examined "[t)he racial and socio-economic characteristics of Americans living in 
residential areas surround [ed) [by) commercial hazardous waste facilities and 
uncontrolled toxic waste sites throughout the United States." [d. at 9. After 
conducting two "cross· sectional" studies, the UCC and Public Data Access, Inc. 
concluded that race reoccurred as the predominant factor in decisions regarding the 
siting of hazardous waste facilities. See id. 
30. See Coyle, supra note 27, at S10. The author elaborates on other defining 
events in the environmental justice movement. See id. See also Mary T. Schmich, 
'Chemical Soup' of Mississippi River Worries &sidents, THE ORANGE COUNTY 
REGISTER, Nov. 20,1988, at A12, available in 1988 WL 4417815. The article discusses 
the "Cancer Alley" protests that occurred in the polluted Mississippi region and the 
lack of real results. See id. 
31. See Schmich, supra note 30, at A12. In this area ofthe Mississippi River, "the 
catfish taste[d) oily, the river shrimp [had) vanished and, at night, acrid odors [drove) 
people inside off their porches. [d. See also J. Michael Kennedy, Danger in Louisiana's 
'Cancer Alley'l Druggist Questions Link Between Miscarriages, Plant Emissions on 
7
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protestors did not get any concessions from the companies who 
contributed to making Louisiana's rivers so heavily polluted, 
Louisiana later made efforts to work with several of these com-
panies and convinced them to install monitors on the pollution 
discharge pipes that "run across River Road like bridlges to the 
levee.n32 
B. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT IN THE 1990s 
The 1987 United Church of Christ Commission For Racial 
Justice report, together with additional overwhelming statis-
tics documenting disproportionate amounts of industrial pollu-
tion in low-income and minority neighborhoods, served as a 
wake-up call to minority communities.33 In 1991, minority 
group representatives from the United States, Canada, Latin 
America and the Pacific Rim gathered in Washington, D.C. for 
the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership 
Summit to confront environmental justice issues.34 At this con-
ference, the participants adopted seventeen environmental jus-
tice principles to combat environmental racism. 35 
River, LOS ANGELES TIMES, May 14, 1989, at I, available in 1989 WL 2738029. In 
1987, according to data submitted to the Environmental Protection Agency from the 
chemical industry, "774 million pounds of toxics were dumped into Louisiana's 
waterways" and "another 134 million pounds oftoxics were released into the air." [d. 
32. Schmich, supra note 30, at A12. Interestingly, the city charged the protestors 
with violating the $740 parade-permit fee requirement, but the article suggested that 
the city used this rule as a pretext for its disapproval of the protestors' message. See 
id. Some of the past plants located in this area were "petrochemical giants" such as 
Shell, Dow, Exxon, Occidental, Du Pont and Union Carbide. See id. 
33. See Flattau, supra note 16. 
34. See Principles of Environmental Justice, Proceedings of the First National 
People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, xiii (1991) (on file with author). 
35. See id. The seventeen principles are as follows: 
1) Environmental justice affirms the sacredness of Mother Earth, ecological 
unity and the interdependence of all species, and the right to be free from 
ecological destruction. 2) Environmental justice demands that public policy be 
based on mutual respect and justice for all peoples, free from any form of 
discrimination or bias. 3) Environmental justice mandates the right to ethical, 
balanced and responsible uses of land and renewable resources in the interest 
of a sustainable planet for humans and other living things. 4) Environmental 
justice calls for universal protection from the extraction, production and 
disposal of toxicJhazardous wastes and poisons and nuclear testing that 
threaten the fundamental right to clean air, land, water and food. 5) 
Environmental justice affirms the fundamental right to political, economic, 
cultural and environmental self-determination of all peoples. 6) 
8
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The summit's theme became "our health is not negotiable" 
which marked a departure from previous NAACP claims that 
the environmental movement stunted the socio-economic 
growth of the African American community.36 
Since the summit, however, not only do minority communi-
ties continue to suffer from the disproportionate effects of toxic 
environments, but their communities are also the last areas to 
have their toxic sites cleaned. 37 White communities with haz-
[d. 
Environmental justice demands the cessation of the production of all toxins, 
hazardous wastes and radioactive materials, and that all past and current 
producers be held strictly accountable to the people for detoxification and the 
containment at the point of production. 7) Environmental justice demands the 
right to participate as equal partners at every level of decision making 
including needs assessment, planning, implementation, enforcement and 
evaluation. 8) Environmental justice affirms the right of all workers to a safe 
and healthy work environment, without being forced to choose between an 
unsafe livelihood and unemployment. It also aflirms the right of those who 
work at home to be free from environmental hazards. 9) Environmental 
justice protects the right of victims of environmental injustice to receive full 
compensation and reparations for damages as well as quality health care. 10) 
Environmental justice considers governmental acts of environmental injustice 
a violation of international law, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
and the United Nations Convention on Genocide. 11) Environmental Justice 
must recognize a special legal and natural relationship of Native Peoples to 
the US government through treaties, agreements, compacts and covenants 
which impose upon the US government a paramount obligation and 
responsibility to affirm the sovereignty and self-determination of the 
indigenous peoples whose lands it occupies and holds in trust. 12) 
Environmental justice affirms the need for urban and rural ecological policies 
to clean-up and rebuild our cities and rural areas in balance with nature, 
honoring the cultural integrity of all our communities, and providing fair 
access for all to the full range of resources. 13) Environmental justice calls for 
the strict enforcement of principles of informed consent, and a halt to the 
testing of experimental reproductive and medical procedures and vaccinations 
on people of color. 14) Environmental justice opposes the destructive 
operations of multinational corporations. 15) Environmental justice opposes 
military occupation, repression and exploitation of lands, peoples and cultures, 
and other life forms. 16) Environmental justice calls for the education of 
present and future generations which emphasizes social and environmental 
issues, based on our experience and an appreciation of our diverse cultural 
perspectives. 17) Environmental justice requires that we, as individuals, 
make personal and consumer choices to consume as little of Mother Earth's 
resources and to produce as little waste as possible; and make the conscious 
decision to challenge and reprioritize our lifestyles to insure the health of the 
natural world for present and future generations. 
36. Flattau, supra note 16. 
37. See United Church of Christ Commission For Racial Justice, Toxic Wastes and 
!W.ce Revisited, An Update of the 1987 Report on the !W.cial and Socioeconomic 
Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites (1994) at 14 (quoting 
Marianne Lavelle and Marcia Coyle, Unequal protection: the racial divide on 
environmental law, NAT. L. J., (Sept. 21, 1993». This update to the 1987 study 
9
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ardous sites "see faster action, better results and stiffer penal-
ties than communities where blacks, Hispanics and other mi-
norities live."38 Thus, not only are these communities overbur-
dened with the hazards, but they are also forced to live with 
these hazards for longer periods of time. 39 
C. AIR POLLUTION REGULATION 
At the same time the environmental justice movement was 
forming, the Federal Clean Air Act regulations also went 
through their own transition, as industry protested that the 
laws were too rigid and costly. 40 Industry wanted the laws to 
focus more on market-based incentive programs which gave 
business more control over the mechanisms by which they 
would control pollution and reduce operation costs. 41 As evi-
denced in the environmental justice context, the ensuing 
changes in the Clean Air Act regulations marked a conflict be-
tween health issues and economic concerns. 42 
The Clean Air Act proscribes the National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS),43 which consist of primary and 
discusses the discrepancy between the fmes levied and the time it takes to dispose of 
toxic hazards in white communities versus minority communities. See id. 
38. Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: the Need 
for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 683 (1992) (quoting Marianne 
Lavelle and Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in Environmental 
Law, NAT'L L. J., (Sept. 21, 1992)). Penalties in white communities affected by 
hazardous waste sites average $335,566 in comparison to $55,318 in minority 
communities. See id. at 683. 
39. See Symposium, Environmental Justice: the Merging of Civil Rights and 
Environmental Activism, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 445 (1994). The speaker 
refers to the National Law Journal which reports that it "uncovered glaring inequities 
in the way the federal EPA enforces its law." Id. at 452. 
40. See Stewart, supra note 6, at 153. Stewart discusses what he characterizes as 
the "indissoluble conflict between environmental goals ... and economic growth .... " 
[d. at 153. . 
41. See infra notes 60·68 and accompanying text for a general discussion of the 
market·based incentive program. 
42. See generally Stewart, supra note 6. See also infra notes 168-170; 186-189 and 
accompanying text for discussion of the conflict between health and cost issues. 
43. See generally Clean Air Act of 1970,42 U.S.C.A. § 7408 (West 1995) (amended 
1990): 
Air quality criteria and control techniques (a) Air pollutant list; publication 
and revision by Administrator; issuance of air quality criteria for air 
pollutants; (b) Issuance by Administrator of information on air pollution 
10
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secondary ambient air quality standards. 44 The Federal Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator determines 
these standards. 45 The Clean Air Act does not make these 
standards directly enforceable against the states!6 Rather, it 
requires each state to develop a State Implementation Plan 
that describes how the state will attain the standards. In fact, 
a state may create a State Implementation Plan that is more 
stringent than the Clean Air Act's standards. Ultimately, each 
State Implementation Plan must meet EPA approval. 47 Once 
the EPA approves it, the Plan can be enforced by both state 
and federal authorities. 48 
ld. 
control techniques; standing consulting committees for air pollutants; 
establishment; and membership; (c) Review, modification, and reissuance of 
criteria or information; (d) Publication in Federal Register; availability of 
copies for general public; (e) Transportation planning and guidelines; (0 
Information regarding processes, procedures, and methods to reduce or control 
pollutants in transportation; reduction of mobile source related pollutants; 
reduction of impact on public health; (g) Assessment of risks to ecosystems; 
and (h) RACTIBACTILAER clearinghouse. 
44. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7409(b) (West 1995) (amended 1990). The Clean Air Act 
defines primary ambient air quality standards as those standards "[iJn the judgment of 
the EPA Administrator ... [are) requisite to protect the public health." ld. § 
7409(b)(l). The Clean Air Act defines secondary ambient air quality standards as 
"requisite to protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse affects 
associated with the presence of such air pollutant in the ambient air." ld. § 7409(b)(2). 
45. See id. All further reference to the "Administrator" is to the Federal 
Environmental Protection Agency Administrator. 
46. See THEODORE L. GARRETT AND SONYA D. WINNER, A CLEAN AIR ACT PRIMER 
(The Environmental Law Reporter, Clean Air Deskbook 1992). The purpose of the 
Clean Air Act is to give the states general guidelines for developing their own plans. 
Once those plans are developed, then they can be enforced against the states. See id. 
at 11. 
47. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(a) (West 1995) (amended 1990). 
State implementation plans for national primary and secondary ambient air 
quality standards (a) Adoption of plan by State; submission to Administrator; 
content of plan; revision; new sources; indirect source review program; 
supplemental or intermittent control systems. (1) Each State shall, after 
reasonable notice and public hearings, adopt and submit to the Administrator, 
within 3 years (or such shorter period as the Administrator may prescribe) 
after the promulgation of a national primary ambient air quality standard (or 
any revision thereoO under section 7409 ... for any air pollutant, a plan which 
provides for the implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of such 
primary standard in each air quality control region (or portion thereoO within 
such State. 
ld. See also GARRETT AND WINNER, supra note 57, at I!. 
48. See 42 V.S.C.A. § 7410 (West 1995) (amended 1990). 
11
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State Implementation Plans permit each state to devise and 
implement plans that suit its particular area and problems. 49 
Each state may incorporate requirements that mirror the more 
traditional command and control system which would entail 
EPA monitoring the methods states use to attain NAAQS.50 
Alternatively, the states have the option to develop market-
based incentive programs in which the states, with the input of 
regulated industry, not the EPA, devise the methods for meet-
ing NAAQS requirement. 51 
1. The Command and Control System 
The command and control system is a form of air pollution 
regulation that "specifies a precise compliance method rather 
than simply an emissions level."52 The command and control 
system imposes "legally enforceable limits, conditions and af-
firmative requirements on industrial operations, generally con-
trolling sources that generate pollution on an individual ba-
sis."53 Each state must devise and implement a plan that com-
plies with the command measures and control techniques ap-
proved by the Administrator.54 These compliance requirements 
49. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION LAw, SCIENCE, AND 
POLICY 792 (2d ed. 1996). 
50. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410 (West 1995) (amended 1990). States have less 
flexibility under the command and control system. See id. 
51. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410 (West 1995) (amended 1990). See also infra notes 
168-170; 186; 189; and accompanying text for discussion of how the problems arise 
when states develop market-based incentive programs that fail to consider public 
health issues. 
52. See David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading An Economic Incentive Program: 
Replacing the Command and Control! Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 289, 297 (1998). Despite this perceived difference, Driesen argues that the 
traditional command and control system is more similar to the market-based incentive 
system than its critics are willing to admit. See id. 
53. Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous 
Journey From Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 104 (1998). For 
example, pollutant air emissions from "each regulated source are liinited to specified 
amounts, with the regulated entity further required to install a technology to meet 
those limitations and to monitor its emissions continuously.» Id. (construing 42 
U.S.C.A. § 7408 (West 1995) (amended 1990». 
54. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(a)(1) (West 1995) (amended 1990). These 
requirements include specific control techniques and time tables by which to 
accomplish the state's plan. See id. § 7410(a)(2)(A-B). 
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must be met within a specific time period. 55 Each regulated 
industry must conform to the Clean Air Act's standards under 
the regulatory plan devised by the state in which its operations 
are located.56 Some of these standards are "technology-forcing" 
because they require industry to implement technological con-
trols regardless of whether such technology yet exists. 57 The 
command and control approach also forces regulated companies 
to pay identical costs regardless of how much each company 
actu~lly contributes to pollution. 58 The traditional command 
and control environmental regulations are, however, not the 
only method used by states to control emissions in order to 
comply with the Clean Air Act. 59 
2. Market-Based Incentive Programs 
The Clean Air Act provides for an alternative pollution con-
trol method known as the market-based incentives approach. 60 
The Clean Air Act included market-based incentives at its in-
ception, but the incentive method has not been utilized to the 
extent of the command and control regulations until relatively 
recently. 61 The concept behind the market-based incentive ap-
proach to pollution control is to provide less expensive alterna-
tives to the command and control system through programs 
55. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(a)(1) (West 1995) (amended 1990). For example, each 
state is required to adopt or submit a plan within three years after the NAAQS are set. 
See id. 
56. See generally 42 U .S.C.A. § 7410 (West 1995) (amended 1990). 
57. See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 264 (1976). The Supreme Court 
interpreted the "as may be necessary language" of 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410 to permit the 
EPA to require industry to develop technology, whether or not it yet exists, to achieve 
NAAQS. Furthermore, the Court found technology-forcing requirements were 
consistent with the Clean Air Act's language. See id. 
58. See Jeremy B. Hockenstein et aI., Crafting the Next Generation of Market-
Based Erwironmental Tools, 39 ENV'T 4, 14 (1997). For example, a company that 
contributes five percent to the overall level of pollution pays the same amount to 
implement the pollution control measures as a company that contributes seventy-five 
percent of the overall pollution. See id. 
59. See infra notes 60-80 and accompanying text for discussion of alternatives to 
the command and control system. 
60. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(a)(2)(A) (West 1995) (amended 1990). 
61. See Hockenstein, supra note 58, at 13. Market-based environmental tools 
"have been part of the environmental policy landscape (though with varying degrees of 
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that «provide an economic benefit for pollution reductions and 
an economic penalty for pollution. "62 The market-based incen-
tive programs may be directed toward stationary or mobile 
sources63 and are designed to create more flexible, less expen-
sive techniques for emissions reduction.64 Market-based incen-
tives are designed to reduce emissions without setting specific 
limits "that individual sources or even all sources in the aggre-
gate are required to meet. "iI5 In contrast to the command and 
control system, the market-based incentive approach does not 
specify how industry will attain the NAAQS.66 Rather, the 
market-based incentives system provides various economic en-
ticements tailored to the individual companies that, in theory, 
will reduce the state's pollution output at a lower cost. 67 Emis-
sions trading is one example of such a market-based incentive 
program.66 
62. Driesen. supra note 52. at 323. The author outlines the arguments as to why 
the market·based incentive system is preferred over the command and control system. 
See id. ' 
63. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(a)(3) (West 1995) (amended 1990). A stationary source 
is dermed as: "any building, structure. facility. or installation which emits or may emit 
any air pollutant." Id. Section 7521 catergorizes mobile sources in terms of what they 
emit and whether they are light· or heavy-duty vehicles. See id. § 7521. . 
as: 
Id. 
64. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.491 (1997). Market-based incentive programs are defined 
[Market-based incentive program] ... means a program which may include 
State established emission fees or a system of marketable permits. or a system 
of State fees on sale or manufacture of products the use of which contributes to 
0 3 [oxide] formation. or any combination of the foregoing or other similar 
measures, as well as incentives and requirements to reduce vehicle emissions 
and vehicle miles traveled in the area. including any of the transportation 
control measure .... Such programs may be directed toward stationary. area, 
and/or mobile sources, to achieve emissions reductions milestones, to attain 
and maintain ambient air quality standards. and/or to provide more flexible. 
lower-cost approaches to meeting environmental goals. 
65. See id. 
66. See Daniel J. Dudek and John Palmisano. Emissions Trading: Why is this 
Thoroughbred Hobbled? 12 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217 (1988). 
67. See Hockenstein, supra note 58, at 15. 
68. See Hockenstein. supra note 58, at 14 for further discussion of other EPA 
approved programs, such as pollution charges. tradeable permits, reducing market 
barriers and elimination of government subsidies. 
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3. Emissions Trading 
In its 1986 "Emissions Trading Policy Statement," the EPA 
provides Clean Air Act and federal regulation compliance 
guidelines for industrial emissions trading. 69 The EPA en-
dorses the use of emissions trading and it maintains that 
"these alternatives do not alter overall air quality require-
ments."70 The policy provides companies with alternative 
methods of achieving pollution control compliance m accor-
dance with the Clean Air Act requirements.71 
Emissions trading has its own "currency" known as emIS-
sions reduction credits (ERCs).72 Facilities involved in emis-
sions trading earn ERCs, which are stored in "banks." The 
various emissions trading programs determine how the ERCs 
are created, banked and distributed. 73 Trading ERCs is not 
limited to the same facility, nor to the same type of pollution 
source.74 A new pollution source that generates 100 tons ofhy-
drocarbon emissions "would be obligated to obtain more than 
100 tons of emissions reductions in order to obtain a permit to 
construct. "75 In order to reach these emission reductions, the 
69. See Emissions Trading Policy Statement: General Principles for Creation, 
Banking and Use of Emission Reduction Credits, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814 (1986). 
70. [d. EPA seeks to ensure that when facilities attempt to utilize more 
economically beneficial techniques, the Clean Air Act requirements will not suffer as a 
consequence. See id. 
71. See id. 
72. See id. See also 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, App. X (1998). Emissions trading programs 
use either rate-based emission limits or overall emission limits "on a source's total 
mass emissions per unit of time" to compel compliance, placing emissions limits on 
either individual sources or facilities as a whole. Rate-based emission limits are also 
called "emissions averaging" while overall limits are referred to as "an emissions cap," 
or the total emissions limit. Id. 
73. See Perry S. Goldschein, Going Mobile: Emissions Trading Gets A Boost From 
Mobile Source Emission Reduction Credits, 13 UCLA J. ENVTL. L & POL'Y 225, 229 
(1994/1995) (identifies specifics of mobile source emissions reduction credits). 
74. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, App. X (1998). "Stationary ... and mobile sources both 
can participate in the same emissions trading market." For example, those areas that 
have a restricted stationary market in comparison to the constraints placed upon its 
mobile sources, benefit by including both stationary and mobile sources in "a single 
emissions trading market." Id. 
75. Dudek and Palmisano, supra note 66, at 224. In 1975, the EPA grappled with 
how to permit new sources of pollutants in areas that have either failed to attain the 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) or failed to demonstrate they could 
15
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new source may utilize what is known as the Offset Policy "so 
long as overall emission reductions [are] achieved within the 
airshed leaving the area better off than before. "76 Under the 
Offset Policy, this new source must offset its pollution by trad-
ing with an already existing source. 77 These offsets are de-
signed to allow continued industrial growth while ensuring an 
overall emissions reductioll, particularly in polluted nonat-
tainment areas where the offset ratios are higher than the new 
source actually needs for its planned emissions. 78 
The EPA generally views emissions trading as a more flexi-
ble method for reducing pollution control costs and reaching 
compliance more quickly as opposed to the time-consnming and 
bureaucratic command and control system. 79 Nonattainment 
regions: such as the Los Angeles region, have reconfIgured 
their methods of pollution control to take advantage of the 
flexibility and economic efficiency of the emissions trading sys-
tem.so 
meet the NAAQS at a future date. The remedy came in the form of the Offset Policy. 
See id. 
76. [d. Therefore, these "new emissions would need to be more than 'offset' by 
emissions reductions." [d. 
77. See PERCIVAL, supra note 49, at 808. The offset policy "envisions ... creating 
an emissions trading market, with fIrms that are building new plants or expanding 
existing plants purchasing pollution reductions from existing facilities." [d. 
78. See Emissions Trading Policy Statement: General Principles for Creation, 
Banking and Use of Emission Reduction Credits, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814 (1986). Industry 
will still be allowed to expand even though it may not have met the National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards required under its State Implementation Plan. See id. See also 
PERCIVAL, supra note 49, at 808. "Emissions trading programs provide fIrms with 
flexibility and then with an incentive to take advantage ofthat flexibility, because any 
successful trade ends up costing the parties less than implementing a uniform level of 
pollution controls .... " [d. 
79. See Emissions Trading Policy Statement: General Principles for Creation, 
Banking and Use of Emission Reduction Credits, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814 (1986). See also 
Stewart, supra note 6, at 153. The command and control system is criticized for its 
bureaucratic centralization, r.Qsts and delay. Proponents of the market-based 
incentives system prefer it to the traditional command and control system because they 
believe market-based incentives provide industry with more flexibility in making 
pollution control decisions that impact them. Proponents argue that industry is better 
qualifIed to make decisions as to the means by which to comply with the NAAQS. See 
id. 
80. See generally Matthew Polesetsky, Comment, Will A Market in Air Pollution 
Clean the Nation's Dirtiest Air? A Study of the South Coast Air Quality Management 
16
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D. THE SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT 
The California Legislature created pollution control districts 
to control air pollution at the regional levePI One such dis-
trict, the South Coast Air Quality Management District 
(SCAQMD), implements the air quality requirements for the 
Los Angeles metropolitan area, home of the United State's 
dirtiest air. 82 The SCAQMD Board of Directors encountered 
difficulties complying with its attainment standards and took 
steps to convert from a command and control system to a mar-
ket-based incentive program.83 
The SCAQMD created the Regional Clean Air Incentive 
Market (RECLAIM) in 1993.84 Under RECLAIM, SCAQMD 
allows polluting industries to earn ERCs or "pollution rights" 
by reducing their emissions below overall annual capS.85 Once 
a polluter earns pollution rights, it may either preserve those 
rights for future use, lower its present emissions caps or it may 
District's Regional Clean Air Incentives Market, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 359 (1995). The 
South Coast Air Quality Management District developed this program in 1993. See id. 
8l. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40410 (West 1996). See also Polesetsky, 
supra note 80, at 362-363. EPA created regional districts to allow states to have more 
control. See id. 
82. See Shipra Bansal and Scott Kuhn, Stopping An Unfair Trade: Environmental 
Justice, Pollution Trading, and Cumulative Impacts in Los Angeles, ENVTL L. NEWS, 
Spring 1998, at 16, 17. This area includes a 6600-square-mile basin consisting of 
Orange, San Bernardino, and Riverside Counties and the non-desert portions of Los 
Angeles. See id. 
83. See Polesetsky, supra note 80, at 364. The author presents a detailed history 
of the development of the SCAQMD's market-based incentives program. See id. 
84. See Pat Leyden, The Price of Change: The Market Incentive Revolution, 12 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 160 (1998). In 1991, "[r)epresentatives from the California 
Air Resources Board, EPA, large and small businesses, environmental groups, labor 
representatives, academia, economists, and the stock and commodities markets went to 
work with the AQMD to write a 'constitution'." Id. 
85. Regional Air District's Market Approach for Stationary Emissions Upheld by 
Court, [Jan.-June) Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1675 (Jan. 2, 1998). See also Do 
market-based emissions controls mean the poor breathe the dirtiest air?, CAL. LAw., 
July 1995, at 39. RECLAIM specifically imposes these emissions caps on nitrogen 
oxides and sulfur oxides. See id. See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 7409(c); 7473(a) (West 1995) 
(amended 1990). These sections discuss nitrogen oxides and sulfur oxides. Both are 
criteria pollutants under the Clean Air Act. See id. 
17
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sell the rights to other companies that exceed their emissions 
caps. 86 
Another method SCAQMD uses to accomplish emission re-
ductions is the use of rules implementing specific programs 
designed to aid companies in achieving lower emissions rates. 87 
One such rule allows industrial polluters to scrap vehicles as 
an emissions reduction method. 88 
1. The Old-Vehicle Scrapping Rule 1610 
The Old-Vehicle Scrapping Rule 1610 (Rule 1610) is one of 
SCAQMD's mobile source offset programs.89 Rule 1610 allows 
industries to meet their pollution discharge limits by reducing 
motor vehicle emissions instead of merely controlling their own 
emissions. 90 
86. See Regional Air District's Market Approach for Stationary Emissions Upheld 
by Court, [Jan.-June] Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1675 (Jan. 2, 1998). 
87. See id. 
88. See Los Angeles, Cal., South Coast Air Quality Management District Rule 1610 
(amended Feb. 12, 1999) (visited April 5, 1999) < http://www.aqmd.gov> (on file with 
author) [hereinafter SCAQMD Rule 1610]. See also Communities for a Better Env't v. 
South Coast Air Quality Dist., Complaint 'lI'lI 12·13 (No. 10R·97-R9) (U.S. EPA filed 
July 23, 1997). Industries, especially the major oil companies, use the vehicle 
scrapping rule as an alternative to a rule that would require them to place vapor-
recovery equipment on their vessels, which would nearly eliminate harmful emissions. 
See id. 
89. See Los Angeles, Cal., South Coast Air Quality Management District 
Regulation XVI Mobile Source Offset Programs (visited Feb. 21, 1999) 
<http://www.aqmd.gov/ruleslhtmlltofc16.html > (on file with author). See also ARB-
EPA Exchange Casts Doubts on Emissions Trading Rules, 11 CAL ENVTL. INSIDER 7 
(1998). The Air Resources Board's Executive Officer announced that he has suspended 
approval of emissions trading rules, specifically citing Rule 1610 and its environmental 
justice implications. See id. See also California: Group [Communities for a Better 
Environment] Files Civil Rights Complaint Against Automobile Scrappage Program, 
[July-Dec.] Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 639 (August I, 1997). The Environmental 
Protection Agency decided in March 1997 that Rule 1610 "does not conform with 
federal rules for economic incentive measures." Id. 
90. See SCAQMD Rule 1610(a). The District divides the various rules into 
different regulations categories. For instance, Regulation XI are source specific 
standards and Regulation XX represent the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market 
regulations. See id. Adopted on January 8, 1993, Rule 1610's goal is to: 
reduce motor vehicle volatile organic compounds (VOC), nitrogen oxides 
(NOx), carbon monoxide (CO), and particulate matter (PM) exhaust emissions 
by issuing mobile source emission reduction credits in exchange for the 
scrapping of old, high emitting vehicles. Procurement of old vehicles could be 
18
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To be eligible to use Rule 1610, however, the vehicles must: 
be pre-1981 models; be in compliance with smog inspections; be 
registered with the California Department of Motor Vehicles 
. for the past two years; be adequately mobile so that its owner 
can drive it to the "scrappage" facility; and have at least three 
years useful remaining life prior to scrapping. 91 Under Rule 
1610, a polluter can purchase motor vehicles from the public. 
These cars are destroyed and then SCAQMD "translates" them 
into smog credits, called Mobile Source Emissions Reductions 
Credits (MSERCs), and these MSERCs can be banked or sold 
to other polluters. 92 Polluters may not use the MSERCs to off-
set emission increases that arise when the polluters have ei-
ther removed the Clean Air Act required emissions controls or 
failed to install the requisite controls as required on stationary 
sources.93 
Id. 
accomplished by persons voluntarily giving up their vehicle for scrapping upon 
receiving an incentive payment. This rule provides a mechanism through 
which stationary source emissions can be brought into compliance with 
District regulations through mobile source emission reductions. Mobile source 
emissions reduction credits (MSERCs) generated may only be applied towards 
compliance with designated rules with future compliance dates within District 
Regulation XI, Source Specific Standards; Regulation XXII, On·Road Motor 
Vehicle Mitigation; Regulation XIII, New Source Review; Regulation XX, 
Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM); or any other District 
regulations that allow the use of credits. MSERCs may not be applied towards 
compliance with federal requirements that do not authorize compliance 
through emissions trading including those promulgated by U.S. EPA as 
authorized ... that do not authorize compliance through emissions trading. 
The value of these credits is based on old vehicles having at least three years 
useful remaining life prior to scrapping. The effective date for Rule 1610 
amendments relating to tlie permanent destruction of engine components 
approved by the Governing Board on February 12, 1999 shall be March 1, 
1999. 
91. See SCAQMD Rule 1610. See also South Coast AQMD, 11 CAL. ENVrL. 
INSIDER 13 (1998) (describes some of the vehicle eligibility requirements). 
92. See SCAQMD Rule 1610. The rule defmes MSERCs as "credit for real, 
quantified emission reductions, approved by the Executive Officer or designee, as 
authorized by this rule, and surplus to emission reductions required by ARB, District, 
and U.S. EPA regulations and the most recent District or U.S. EPA approved Air 
Quality Management Plan, whichever is more stringent. " See id. at Rule 1610(b)(1). 
93. See id. at Rule 1610(a). Regulation XI does not allow oil companies to 
substitute a Clean Air Act requirement, such as Marine Tank Vessel Operations Rule 
1142, for a proposed emissions trading program like Rule 1610. See id. 
19
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2. The Marine Tank Vessel Operations Rule 1142 
Another emissions control rule in effect in the Los Angeles 
basin is known as the Marine Tank Vessel Operations Rule 
1142 (Rule 1142).94 Rule 1142 applies to marine tank vessels95 
engaged in loading, lightering, ballasting, or housekeeping 
events in which either the vessel's tank or cargo is filled with 
organic liquid 96 Rule 1142 requires marine vessels, such as 
those used by oil companies, to install marine vapor recovery 
equipment that reduces the amount of harmful vapor emlS-
sions.97 
When the marine vapor recovery equipment is not used, 
volatile organic compounds, such as benzene, are released into 
94. See Los Angeles, Cal., South Coast Air Quality Management District Rule 1142 
(adopted July 19, 1991) (visited Feb. 21, 1998) <http://www.aqmd.gov> (on file with 
author) [hereinafter SCAQMD Rule 11421. Rule 1142 was adopted in 1991 and 
approved by the EPA for submission into SCAQMD's State Implementation Plan, 
effective January, 1992. See id. at Rule 1142(c)(1)(A). 
95. See id. at Rule 1142(b)(11). Marine tank vessels include tugboats, tankers and 
watercraft. See id. 
96. See id. at Rule 1142(b). Ballasting refers to "the loading of water or other 
liquid into a marine tank vessel's cargo tank to obtain proper propeller, rudder and 
hull immersion." [d. at Rule 1142(b)(2). Housekeeping refers to the "altering of the 
composition of gases contained within marine vessel tanks by tank washing, gas 
freeing, or purging." [d. at Rule 1142(b)(7). Lightering means "the transfer of organic 
liquid into a cargo tank from one marine tank vessel to another." [d. at Rule 
1142(b)(9). Loading means "an incident or occurrence beginning with the connecting of 
marine terminal storage tanks or a marine tank vessel to marine tank vessel cargo 
tank(s) with pipes or hoses followed by the transfer of liquid cargo and ending with the 
disconnecting of the pipes or hoses; or any other means of placing liquid into cargo 
tanks." [d. at Rule 1142(b)(10). Organic liquid includes various forms of gasoline, 
crude oil and other liquids that contain volatile organic compounds. See id. at Rule 
1142(b)(13). 
97. See id. at Rule 1142(c)(1)(A). "Effective January 1, 1992, an owner or operator 
of a marine tank vessel equipped with emissions control equipment shall operate such 
equipment while conducting a loading, lightering, ballasting, or housekeeping event in 
South Coast Waters." The emissions control equipment "shall be designed and 
operated to collect, store, and process all emissions of volatile organic compounds 
resulting from a loading, lightering, ballasting, or housekeeping event." [d. at 
1142(c)(3). Furthermore, such events: 
shall not be conducted in South Coast waters unless: (i) the emissions of 
volatile organic compounds are limited to 5.7 grams per cubic meter (2 lbs. per 
1,000 barrels) of liquid loaded into a marine tank vessel; or (ii) the emissions 
of volatile organic compounds are reduced by at least 95 percent by weight 
from uncontrolled conditions. 
Id. at Rule 1142(c)(1)(b)(i -ii). 
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the air.9S The marine vapor recovery process is extremely effec-
tive because it reduces toxic chemical vapors by over ninety-
five percent and reduces or eliminates the escape of other 
harmful vapors. 99 However, oil companies claim that installing· 
the equipment is extremely costly.loo Thus, if they could rely on 
another emissions reduction rule, such as Rule 1610, oil com-
panies believe they would be more economically benefited. 101 
SCAQMD allowed five oil companies to employ Rule 1610 
instead of implementing Rule ·1142. 102 While oil companies who 
substitute other emission control rules for Rule 1142 may be 
saving money by not installing the marine vapor recovery 
equipment, the oil companies do so at the cost of people living 
in the San Pedro and Wilmington South Coast Air Basin (air 
basin) who breathe the benzene-filled air. loa Latino's comprise 
98. See Communities for a Better Env't v. South Coast Air Quality Dist., 
Complaint'll 12 (No. 10R·97·R9) (U.S. EPA filed July 23, 1997). See also SCAQMD 
Rule 1610(b)(8). Rule 1610 defines volatile organic compounds as "any volatile 
compound of carbon, excluding: methane, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, carbonic 
acid, metallic carbides or carbonates, ammonium carbonate, and exempt compounds as 
defined in District Rule 102." [d. 
99. See id. 
100. See Memorandum from Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Legal Director, 
Communities for a Better Environment (July 18, 1997) (on file with author). The 
estimated cost of installing the marine vapor recovery equipment per company would 
total approximately $5 Million. See id. 
101. See id. The oil companies argue that instead of spending the approximately 
$5 Million for the vapor control equipment, they should be allowed to buy MSERCs. 
Drury asserts, however, that even though the oil companies would have to pay this 
price, the "cost per pound of pollution reduced is actually low in comparison to other 
control technologies." [d. 
102. See Communities for a Better Env't v. South Coast Air Quality Dist., 
Complaint'll 23-24 (No. 10R-97-R9) (U.S. EPA filed July 23, 1997). Communities for a 
Better Environment (CBE) also filed civil complaints against individual oil companies 
it alleged violated the Clean Air Act. The original Clean Air Act civil complaints 
named five oil companies: GATX Corp., Unocal (now owned by Tosco), Tosco, Chevron 
and Ultramar. See Communities for a Better Env't v. GATX Terminals Corp., 
Complaint, (No. 98-1282 ER (BQRx)) (C.D. Cal. Filed March 26, 1998) (GATX has a 
consent decree settlement; Tosco's complaint was dismissed; and Unocal's complaint 
was dismissed without prejudice). See also Communities for a Better Env't v. South 
Coast Air Quality Management Dist., Order (No. 98-5877 DT(BQRx)) (C.D. Filed Feb. 
I, 1999). Tosco filed a defamation suit CBE based on the original complaint which 
alleged that Tosco violated the feder~l and state environmental laws. The court 
granted CBE's 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss without prejudice. 
103. See Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82, at 17-18. 
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a majority of the air basin population. 104 When federally 
funded programs, such as SCAQMD's emission control rules, 
specifically impact members of a minority group, these pro-
grams may violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and its im-
plementing regulations. 105 
E. TITLE VI OF THE CML RIGHTS ACT 
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Title VI) was not de-
signed to operate as a penalty, but rather to ensure that recipi-
ents of government funds do not use these funds in a discrimi-
natory manner.106 The Civil Rights Act authorizes each agency 
to promulgate regulations that will satisfy the statute's goals. 107 
Federal agencies have used Title VI to address the environ-
mental justice concerns raised in the 1983 GAO report and the 
President's Executive Order 12,898 by tying money to enVI-
ronmental equality in funded programs. lOS 
The EPA administers many fmancial assistance programs 
and has created its own implementing regulations that forbid 
federal financial assistance recipients, such as SCAQMD, to 
use criteria or methods that have discriminatory effects on 
104. See Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82, at 16. 
105. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, §601, as amended 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (West 
1994). 
106. See id. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act provides that "[nlo person in the United 
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id. See also Lau v. 
Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). The Supreme Court found that despite the absence of 
intentional discrimination, non-English speaking Chinese students were disparately 
affected when they were denied equal educational benefits. The court interpreted Title 
VI to bar practices that had a discriminatory effect, irrespective of whether intentional 
discrimination was present. See id. at 568. 
107. See Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism Claims Brought Under Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 285, 312 (1995). Litigants are starting to prefer Title 
VI over the Equal Protection Clause because Title VI allows suits to be brought when 
the complainant can demonstrate discriminatory effects, while the Equal Protection 
Clause requires proof of intentional discrimination. See id. at 311. 
108. See generally U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL TITLE VI 
ENFORCEMENT TO ENSURE NONDISCRIMINATION IN FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS 415 
(1996). The Commission on Civil Rights took the findings of the GAO Report and 
President Clinton's Executive Order on environmental justice very seriously. See id. at 
417. 
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groups because of race, color, national origin or sex. 109 Actions 
taken by recipients of EPA financial assistance, including the 
recipient's choice of locating its facilities, are subject to these 
requirements. 110 The EPA's environmental justice role is coor-
dinated with the Office of Civil Rights. III 
When bringing a Title VI claim, a claimant need not demon-
strate intentional discrimination if the claimant is able to pro-
vide evidence of a disparate impact on minorities. 112 Hence, 
even though a company may not have intended a harmful im-
pact on a minority community, it is still subject to Title VI 
claims and violations because a company's intent is irrele-
vantY3 
Because the SCAQMD qualifies as an EPA recipient of fed-
eral fmancial assistance, it is subject to Title VI and EPA's cor-
responding implementing regulations. 114 Therefore, minority 
claimants who have complaints against rules implemented by 
109. See generally Fisher, supra note 107, at 285. The EPA provides funding for 
many state hazardous waste enforcement programs. See id. at 312. See also 40 C.F.R. 
§ 7.30 (1997). This statute grants the EPA authority to create its own promulgating 
regulations. See id. According to section 7.35(b) a federal financial assistance recipient 
can be a local government entity such as the SCAQMD. Furthermore, the recipient 
"shall not use criteria or methods ... which have the effect of subjecting individuals to 
discrimination .... " [d. at § 7.35(b). 
110. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1997). 
111. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 7.120, 7.130(b) (1997). To pursue a Title VI claim, the 
complainant must submit a complaint to the Office of Civil Rights (OCR), which will in 
tum investigate the claim. During the first twenty days after receipt of the complaint, 
OCR will make a decision as to whether to go forward with the complaint. If the OCR 
accepts the complaint, it will notify both the complainant and the federal funds 
recipient and provide the recipient thirty days to respond, rebut or deny the allegations 
in the complaint. Should OCR make a final determination that the recipient is in 
noncompliance with Title VI, OCR will begin its procedure to "deny, annul, suspend or 
terminate" its financial assistance. In order to reach this determination, OCR will 
have sent the recipient various correspondence in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 7.115. 
After the recipient has had an opportunity to respond to, rebut or deny the complaint's 
claims, OCR will notify the recipient of its preliminary findings and provide it with 
recommendations or give it the right to engage in voluntary compliance. OCR will 
continue to have contact with the recipient and will only withdraw funds as a last 
resort. This process shall be completed within 180 days from the start of the 
compliance review or complaint investigation. See id. §§7.120, 7.130(b). 
112. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1997). 
113. See id. 
114. See id. § 7.15. 
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SCAQMD may fIle Title VI complaints with the EPA against 
SCAQMD, and allege that the SCAQMD rules creatEl a dispa-
rate impact on racial minorities. 115 
CBE fIled an administrative complaint with the EPA 
against the SCAQMD on July 23, 1997. 116 CBE's administra-
tive complaint represents the first time Title VI, EPA's Title VI 
implementing regulations and Executive Order 12,898 have 
been used to challenge the distributional consequences of emis-
sions trading. 117 
III. DISCUSSION 
By fIling its complaint, Communities for a Better Environ-
ment (CBE) sought to stop oil companies from using the Old-
Vehicle Scrapping Rule 1610 (Rule 1610) in lieu of the Marine 
Tank Vessel Operations Rule 1142 (Rule 1142).118 CBE con-
tended that Rule 1610 was illus~rative of the problems with 
emissions trading programs and that these programs ignored 
cumulative environmental impacts and environmental justice 
concerns. 119 Instead of employing Rule 1142, which would have 
captured nearly ninety-five percent of the harmful vapors in 
the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD), 
CBE stated that the companies used Rule 1610 as a "loophole" 
for cost efficiency. 120 
On July 23, 1997, on behalf of minorities living in the San 
Pedro and Wilmington South Coast Air Basin (air basin), CBE 
115. See 42 V.S.C.A. § 200Od-1 (West 1994). 
116. See Challenges Filed To Implementation of SCAQMD Scrapping llule, 11 CAL. 
ENVTL. INSIDER 5 (1997). Communities for a Better Environment (CBE) is a non-profit 
organization that litigates environmental and environmental justice issues. CBE filed 
the complaint along with Los Angeles Communidades Asambladas Vnidas para un 
Sostenible Ambiente, CBE's community organizing project. 
117. See Memorand um from Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Legal Director, 
Communities for a Better Environment (July 18, 1997) (on file with author). 
118. See Communities for a Better Env't. v. South Coast Air Quality Management 
Dist., Complaint'll 2 (No. 10R-97-R9) (V.S. EPA filed July 23, 1997). CBE's major 
'concern is the grave environmental justice impact on the minority communities in the 
South Coast Air Quality Management District. See generally id. 
119. See id. at '11'11 1-3. 
120. See id. See also notes 100-101 and accompanying text for a discussion of costs 
to install the vapor recovery equipment. 
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fIled an administrative complaint with the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA). 121 This complaint alleged that 
SCAQMD and the California Air Resources Board (CARB) vio-
lated Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Title VI), EPA's Ti-
tle VI implementing regulations and Executive Order 12,898.122 
CBE's 'goal was to force the oil companies to comply with 
SCAQMD Rule 1142.123 CBE also fIled Clean Air Act civil com-
plaints against each of the oil companies who did not install the 
marine vapor recovery equipment, alleging their actions vio-
lated the Clean Air Act. 124 
A. THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT 
In its complaint, CBE alleged that SCAQMD and CARBI25 
violated Title VI by allowing the oil companies to misuse the 
emissions trading Rule 1610 which in turn created a disparate 
impact on the surrounding minority community.l26 In addition, 
121. See Communities for a Better Env't. v. South Coast Air Quality Management 
Dist., Complaint (No. 10R-97-R9) (U.S. EPA filed July 23,1997). 
122. See id. at 'lI 1. 
123. See Memorandum from Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Legal Director, 
Communities for a Better Environment (July 18, 1997). 
124. See Communities for a Better Env't v. GATX Terminals Corp., Complaint (No. 
98·1282 ER (BQRx» (C.D. Cal. Filed July 23, 1997); Communities for a Better Env't v. 
Unocal, Complaint (C.D. Cal. Filed July 23, 1997); Communities for a Better Env't v. 
Tosco, Complaint (No. 98-5877 DT(BQRx» (C.D. Cal. Filed July 23, 1997); 
Communities for a Better Env't v. Chevron, Complaint (No. 98-5173 DT (BQRx» (C.D. 
Cal. Filed July 23, 1997); Communities for a Better Env't v. Ultramar, Complaint (No. 
98-5174 DT (BQRx» (C.D. Cal. Filed July 23, 1997). 
125. See Communities for a Better Env't. v. South Coast Air Quality Management 
Dist., Complaint'll 13 (No. 10R-97-R9) (U.S. EPA filed July 23, 1997). The complaint 
names both the South Coast Air Quality Management District and the California Air 
Resources Board (CARB). CARB is the state agency that works with both the U.S. and 
California EPA to approve environmental emissions control programs. See id. 
126. See generally Communities for a Better Env't. v. South Coast Air Quality 
Management Dist., Complaint (No. 10R-97-R9) (U.S. EPA flied July 23, 1997). CBE 
filed this administrative complaint with the EPA with hopes that the EPA would also 
find that the SCAQMD violated Title VI. See id. See also Letter from David P. 
Howekamp, Director, Air Division, United States Environmental Protection Agency, to 
Barry Wallerstein, Executive Officer, South Coast Air Quality Management District, 
(February 10, 1999) (on file with author). In this letter, Mr. Howekamp's comments 
regarding SCAQMD Rule 1610 references the May 1997 version of the rule, but he also 
states that the February 1999 version of SCAQMD Rule 1610 still does not address all 
of EPA's concerns and therefore would also not be approved. See id. EPA's concerns 
are that: 1) SCAQMD Rule 1610, May 1997 version, does not "lead to old car emissions 
25
Razon: Environmental Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999
564 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:539 
by allowing the oil companies to use Rule 1610, SCAQMD ig-
nored the pleas for environmental justice. 127 
SCAQMD's application of Rule 1610 creates a disparate im-
pact on the Latinos who live and work in the affected area and 
also contributes to an uneven distribution of harmful vapors in 
the air basin. l28 CBE requests that the EPA prohibit SCAQMD 
from operating the Rule 1610 program and if SCAQMD re-
fuses, then CBE requests the EPA to withdraw its fmancial 
assistance from the SCAQMD. I29 
B. CLEAN AIR ACT SUITS AGAINST THE OIL COMPANIES 
On July 23, 1997, CBE also fIled civil suits against five oil 
companies it considered responsible for releasing harmful vola-
tile organic compounds into the air basin in violation of the 
Clean Air Act.130 The named oil companies used Rule 1610 as 
being taken out of the air"; 2) SCAQMD Rule 1610, May 1997 and February 1999 
versions, still "allow the use of credits generated in the past through the lise of engine 
sanding at facilities for compliance with federal requirements such as new source 
review (NSR) offsets '" and reductions necessary to demonstrate attainment of and 
progress towards the national ambient air quality standard for ozone"; and 3) 
SCAQMD Rule 1610, May 1997 and February 1999 versions, do not address that "Rule 
1610 does not require a careful examination of how the program is operating and 
whether cleaner air results from its implementation." [d. Furthermore, EPA notes 
that it is currently reviewing the market-based incentive progr~m policy to address 
environmental justice. When these revisions are complete, "EPA expects that 
[SCAQMD) Rule 1610 will need to incorporate those [environmental justice) elements. 
[However, the EPA) would not cite [environmental justice) issuers) as a reason for 
disapproving Rule 1610 until [EPA's) policy has been revised." [d. . 
127. See generally Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82. 
128. See Communities for a Better Env't v. South Coast Air Quality Management 
Dist., Complaint 'J[ 2 (No. 10R-97-R9) (U.S. EPA filed July 23, 1997). See also Smog 
and Health, Health Effects Studies, (visited Feb. 21, 1999) <http://www.aqmd.gov> (on 
file with author) [hereinafter Smog and Health). Smog and Health reports from a 1991 
study, conducted by Dr. Jane Hall of Cal State Fullerton, that minorities as a whole 
were "exposed more often to poor air quality since they tend to live in more polluted air 
where housing is affordable. African Americans and Hispanics ... [also) tend to work 
in outdoor occupations." [d. 
129. See Communities for a Better Env't v. South Coast Air Quality Management 
Dist., Complaint 'J[ 1 (No. 10R-97-R9) (U.S. EPA filed July 23,1997). 
130. See Communities for a Better Env't v. GATX Terminals Corp., Complaint (No. 
98-1282 ER (BQRx)) (C.D. Cal. Filed July 23, 1997); Communities for a Better Env't v. 
Unocal, Complaint (C.D. Cal. Filed July 23, 1997); Communities for a Better Env't v. 
Tosco, Complaint (No. 98-5877 DT(BQRx)) (C.D. Cal. Filed July 23, 1997); 
Communities for a Better Env't v. Chevron, Complaint (No. 98-5173 DT (BQRx)) (C.D. 
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an alternative to the perceived more costly Rule 1142, which 
required them to install vapor control equipment used during 
tanker loadings. 131 CBE asserted that by trading Mobile Source 
Emissions Reduction Credits (MSERCs) in this manner, the oil 
companies violated the Clean Air Act requirements. 132 By us-
ing Rule 1610 in lieu of Rule 1142, the oil companies contrib-
uted to negative cumulative impacts on air quality in the air 
basin. l33 Although the aggregate level of air pollution in the 
Los Angeles area was reduced, because Rule 1142 was not em-
ployed in the air basin, the people who live and work in that 
area were still subjected to harmful vapors. 134 
Despite the success of the marine vapor control equipment 
in other regions, and the harm caused by failure to use this 
method, the oil companies continued to claim that their use of 
Rule 1610 contributed to the reduction of emissions in the en-
tire Los Angeles region in a more economical fashion. l35 By 
using Rule 1610, they claimed they contributed to the reduc-
tion of emissions in the entire Los Angeles region. 136 
C. STATUS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL COMPLAINTS 
Currently, the Title VI Complaint is still under investiga-
tion by the EPA 137 This investigation, however, has prompted 
Cal. Filed July 23, 1997); Communities for a Better Env't v. Ultramar, Complaint (No. 
98·5174 DT (BQRx)) (C.D. Cal. Filed July 23, 1997). 
131. See id. 
132. See id. 
133. See Communities for a Better Env't. v. South Coast Air Quality Management 
Dist., Complaint'll 2 (No. 10R-97-R9) (U.S. EPA filed July 23, 1997). When small 
regions of an air district are subjected to harmful vapors while the rest of the region 
becomes cleaner, such an area is known as a "toxic hotspot. n [d. at 'II 17. 
134. See Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82, at 17. 
135. See Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82, at 17-18. See also Memorandum from 
Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Legal Director, Communities for a Better Environment (July 
18, 1997) (on file with author). For example, by relying on Rule 1610, the oil companies 
spent $4.4 million total as opposed to the $5 million it would cost to install the marine 
vapor recovery equipment. See id. 
136. See Communities for a Better Env't. v. South Coast Air Quality Management 
Dist., Complaint 'l1'li21-24 (No. 10R-97-R9) (U.S. EPA filed July 23,1997). 
137. See Letter from David P. Howekamp, Director, Air Division, United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, to Barry Wallerstein, Executive Officer, South Coast 
Air Quality Management District, (February 10, 1999) (on file with author). 
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EPA review of both Rules 1610 and 1142.138 With respect to the 
Clean Air Act civil complaints, of the five originally named oil 
companies: GATX Corp. has signed a consent decree; the com-
plaint against Unocal (now owned by Tosco) was dismissed 
without prejudice; the complaint against Tosco was dismissed; 
and the complaints against Chevron and Ultramar are still 
pending. 139 
IV. CRITIQUE 
As both of the Communities for a Better Environment 
(CBE) complaints illustrate, the oil companies' and the South 
Coast Air Quality Management District's (SCAQMD) behavior 
has further exasperated this struggle for environmental jus-
tice. 140 While the aggregate Los Angeles area may have a re-
duction in vehicle emissions due to the implementation of the 
Old-Vehicle Scrapping Rule 1610 (Rule 1610), the overall 
harmful emissions in the San Pedro and Wilmington South 
Coast Air Basin (air basin) have not been reduced. 141 In fact, 
the SCAQMD's decision to allow the oil companies to use Rule 
1610 in lieu of the Marine Tank Vessel Operations Rule 1142 
(Rule 1142) has had the effect of concentrating harmful emis-
sions in the air basin. 142 As a result, the primarily Latino 
community in the air basin suffers disproportionate harm in 
comparison with other communities throughout the 
SCAQMD.I43 Because of the environmental justice problems 
138. See id. 
139. See Communities for a Better Env't v. GATX Terminals Corp., Joint 
Stipulation on Consent Decree, (No. 98·1282 ER (BQRx)) (C.D. Cal. Filed March 26, 
1998). 
140. See Challenges Filed to Implementation of SCAQMD Scrapping Rule, 11 CAL. 
ENVTL. INSIDER 5 (1997). 
141. Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82, at 18. In taking older, high·emitting 
vehicles off the road, the oil companies contribute to cleaning up the air in the entire 
SCAQMD. However, the oil companies purchased the mobile source emission 
reduction credits, instead of installing the equipment. Thus, the primarily Latino 
population in the air basin felt and continues to feel the harmful effects. See id. 
142. See Communities for a Better Env't v. South Coast Air Quality Dist., 
Complaint '11'11 18·26 (No. 10R·97·R9) (U.S. EPA fIled July 23,1997). 
143. See id. at 22. 
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created by this policy, SCAQMD's decisions need reevalu-
ation.I44 
A ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND TITLE VI IMPLICATIONS OF 
RULE 1610 
If the oil companies had installed the vapor emissions con-
trol equipment as required under Rule 1142, they would have 
prevented most, if not all, of the harmful vapors from dispers-
ing into the air. I45 Instead, the Latino community in the air 
basin continues to be subjected to a toxic environment.146 If the 
oil companies still desire to simultaneously accumulate Mobile 
Source Emission Reduction Credits (MSERCs) to engage in 
permissible emissions trades, they could do so by making sure 
that their trades reduce emissions throughout the Los Angeles 
area, including the air basin. I47 Hence, the oil companies could 
have reduced the severe impacts on the neighboring communi-
ties and still have engaged in emissions trading. 148 
B. THE BROADER E'NVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF RULE 
1610 
Rule 1610's primary environmental consequences stem from 
its initial implementation. 149 The industrial polluters who 
144. See generally Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82. 
145. Communities for a Better Env't v. South Coast Air Quality Dist., Complaint 'lI 
13 (No. 10R-97-R9) (U.S. EPA filed July 23, 1997). 
146. See id. at 'lI 10 (quoting Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in 
Environmental Law, NAT'L L. J., Sept 21, 1992). The National Law Journal article 
discusses the inequities minorities face with regard to EPA's enforcement of these 
groups' environmental rights. See id. 
147. See generally id. 
148. See Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82, at 18-20. Thus, the severe impacts on 
the Latino community in the air basin could have been avoided. See id. See also Smog 
and Health, Health Effects Studies, (visited Feb. 21, 1999) <http://www.aqmd.gov> (on 
file with author). The impact includes increased cancer rates of workers and residents 
in the polluted region. See id. 
149. See generally South Coast AQMD, 11 CAL. ENVfL. INSIDER 13 (1998). This 
article lists some proposed solutions to address the problems with SCAQMD Rule 1610. 
Some of the proposed solutions include: 
a visual and functional inspection of the vehicle by the scrapper when an 
owner volunteers it for scrapping. The staff proposal outlines a number of 
requirements that the scrapper must verify, including that the doors are 
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qualify under and participate in the emissions trading program 
undermine the goals of Rule 1610 by violating its require-
ments. l50 In addition, the ''vehicle scrappers" often fail to com-
pletely destroy the vehicles and instead dismantle the vehicles 
for spare parts. 151 Further, SCAQMD has also overestimated 
the value of the MSERCs, as the vehicle owner probably would 
have taken the car out of circulation despite the program. 152 
With such evidence, SCAQMD should recognize these inherent 
problems and address them so that the goals of the program 
will be attained. 153 
C. INCOMPATffiIUTY OF RULE 1610 AND RULE 1142 
In addition to the problems associated with its implementa-
tion, Rule 1610's plain language does not permit oil companies 
to use Rule 1610 in lieu of Rule 1142}54 Rather, MSERCs may 
be used only to comply with Rule 1142 to the extent that they 
are not used to offset emissions increases resulting from either 
removal of or noncompliance with emissions control equip-
ment. l55 SCAQMD's policy does just that: it allows the oil com-
1d. 
present, that the windshield wipers work, that all pedals are present and 
operational, that bumpers are present and functional, etc. The scrapper must 
put the vehicle through a driver test that demonstrates that it is in good 
working condition. Criteria that the vehicle must meet during the test are 
specified. There are provisions for retesting a vehicle that initially fails the 
test. 
150. See CBE Sues SCAQMD Over Amendments to Car Scrapping Rule, 12 CAL. 
ENVTL. INSIDER 10 (1998). For instance, SCAQMD Rule 1610 requires the cars to have 
at least three years of useful life left in them, yet more often than not, the car barely 
works enough to make it to the scrapper. See id. 
151. See id. A SCAQMD inspector noted that a car engine obtained from a 
scrapped Volkswagen was resold for use in another car, thereby defeating the purpose 
of scrapping the car. See id. 
152. See South Coast AQMD, 11 CAL. ENVTL. INSIDER 13 (1998). Thus, the car 
owner probably would have removed the car anyway because of new insurance 
requirements or "natural attrition.» 1d. 
153. See id. 
154. See supra note 90 for discussion of SCAQMD Rule 1610's purpose. 
155. See Los Angeles, Cal., South Coost Air Quality Management District Rule 
1610(a) (amended Feb. 12, 1999) (visited April 5, 1999) <http://www.aqmd.gov> (on me 
with author) [hereinafter SCAQMD Rule 1610). The SCAQMD Regulation XI sets 
forth these specific trade requirements so that such trades will actually decrease 
emissions. See id. 
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panies to trade MSERCs instead of installing the vapor recov-
ery equipment. In addition, the Clean Air Act requires 
SCAQMD to enforce Rule 1142, as it is already part of its State 
Implementation Plan, while Rule 1610 has not been approved 
by the EP A I56 Thus, SCAQMD's choice not to enforce Rule 
1142, while simultaneously implementing Rule 1610, is con-
trary to the requirements of the Clean Air Act. 
Furthermore, the use of MSERCs to offset mobile source 
emissions limitations is questionable, as source offsets tradi-
tionally refer only to stationary sources to ensure actual emis-
sions reductions. 157 The inherently different natures of marine 
tank vessels, as stationary sources, and motor vehicles, as mo-
bile sources, result in disparate effects from their emissions. 158 
Thus, the use of Rule 1610 by the oil companies allows incom-
patible trades.I59 
In addition, removing high-emitting cars from the pollution 
source pool, rather than installing the marine vapor recovery 
equipment, the oil companies claim that the entire region bene-
fits. Given the mobile nature of cars, the reduction of vehicle 
emissions has a cumulative impact in the Los Angeles region as 
a whole. Iso However, three of the marine terminal sites are 10-
156. See Challenges Filed to Implementation of SCAQMD Scrapping Rule, 11 CAL. 
ENVTL. INSIDER 13 (1997). See also Letter from David P. Howekamp, Director, Air 
Division, United States Environmental Protection Agency, to Barry Wallerstein, 
Executive Officer, South Coast Air Quality Management District, (February 10, 1999) 
(on file with author). As of April 5, 1999, the EPA still had not approved Rule 1610. 
See id. 
157. See David M. Driesen, Trade as a Technique, Not a Religion, at 6·7, presented 
at Air Management Advisory Committee Stationary Source Subcommittee New York 
State Department of Environmental Conservation (Jan. 5, 1993) (on file with author). 
In his presentation, Driesen argued that "Congress did not intend to authorize offsets 
from mobile sources or the use of credits outside the regulated source toward 
[Reasonably Available Control Technology) compliance when it amended the Act in 
1990." Furthermore, he argued that if Congress had intended to allow mobile source 
reductions to be used in this manner, it would have "raised the offset ratios, since the 
scarcity of offsets would diminish." Id. 
158. See Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82, at 18·20. 
159. See id. 
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cated in the predominantly Latino air basin. 161 Thus, while 
reducing pollution in the Los Angeles region, the harmful emis-
sions from the oil companies' activities remain concentrated in 
the air basin. 162 Therefore, the alleged success of the use of 
Rule 1610 in lieu of Rule 1142 is deceptive because the oil com-
panies can claim they contribute to the aggregate decrease of 
harmful emissions in the Los Angeles area, yet the real harm 
caused by their operating in the air basin where they have 
failed to make reductions persists. 163 
Furthermore, the pollutants reduced from mobile source 
emissions are not equivalent to the stationary source emissions 
because cars primarily emit carbon monoxide whereas the ma-
rine vessels emit volatile organic compounds, such as benzene. 
Thus, SCAQMD too contributes to the cumulative impact of 
emissions pollution in the air basin by allowing the oil compa-
nies to operate in this manner. 
v. PROPOSAL 
Environmental justice advocates attempt to ensure that mi-
nority communities do not continue to be unfairly laden with 
environmental hazards. l64 At the same time, industry regu-
lated under the Clean Air Act will attempt to comply with the 
Act in the most economical manner.l65 To protect the interests 
of both of these two competing ideologies, the market-based 
incentive programs, such as emissions trading, must be moni-
tored. l66 Additionally, environmental justice concerns must be 
addressed at the forefront of emissions trading program deci-
sions. 167 
161. See id. at 18. Thus, the Latino community is subjected to the toxic vapors. 
See id. 
162. See id. at 18-19. 
163. See generally Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82. 
164. See generally Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82. CBE is one example of an 
environmental justice advocate. See id. 
165. See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of why industry 
views the market-based incentive programs as more economically efficient. 
166. See Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82, at 21-22. 
167. See id. at 21. 
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A EMISSIONS TRADES MUST BE MORE CLOSELY MONITORED 
Industry must recognize that emissions trading and Com-
mand and control regulations can actually work together. l68 Oil 
companies weighed only the economic savings of not installing 
the vapor control equipment, rather than considering the com-
patibility of the trades in which they engaged. 169 In order to 
ensure that industry will act responsibly and ethically, indus-
try trades should be extensively monitored by groups outside 
the polluting industry. 170 
Also, as demonstrated with the Old-Vehicle Scrapping Rule 
1610 (Rule 1610), the emissions trading programs do not al-
ways work as designed.171 Thus, the trades must be more 
closely monitored, by groups like Communities for a Better En-
vironment (CBE), to prevent the creation of future toxic hot-
spots. 172 
B. ALL INTERESTED PARTIES SHOULD BE CONSULTED 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) states 
that, aside from such market considerations, other issues must 
be considered such as enforcement issues and public accep-
tance.173 Having primarily consulted with business interests 
instead of environmental or other public interest groups, the 
South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) in-
sured that no voices of dissent or alternative suggestions would 
168. See Driesen, supra note 52, at 311. 
169. See Memorandum from Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Legal Director, 
Communities for a Better Environment (July 18, 1997) (on file with author). The oil 
companies were more concerned about the money they saved by not installing the 
$5,000,000 marine vapor recovery equipment. Thus, the oil companies saved only 
approximately $600,000. See id. See also supra notes 100·10l. 
170. See SCAQMD Chair Unveils Environmental Justice Initiatives, 11 CAL. 
ENVTL. INSIDER 9 (1997). Approximately a month and a half after CBE challenged the 
SCAQMD's practices, SCAQMD's chair came up with a plan to prevent further 
environmental injustice. See id. 
171. See South Coast AQMD, 12 CAL. ENVfL. INSIDER 18 (1998). 
172. See Challenges Filed to Implementation of SCAQMD Scrapping Rule, 11 CAL. 
ENVTL. INSIDER 5 (1997). See also supra notes 150-153 and accompanying text for 
evidence of Rule 1610's ineffectiveness. 
173. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, App. X (1998). 
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stall or dispose of the proposed program. 174 SCAQMD should 
have consulted a diverse group of parties before haVJing imple-
mented the rule. 175 
With the advice of such groups, SCAQMD officials could 
better monitor emissions trading techniques at their inception 
to ensure that each emission trade is viable and that it does not 
result in discriminatory effects in certain regions. 176 In order to 
have an effective program, SCAQMD must be certain that the 
program achieves pollution control and is properly imple-
mented. 177 Finally, new methods, such as Rule 1610, must be 
more closely evaluated before implementation, because a trad-
ing program will not be effective unless it actually decreases 
pollution. 178 
C. EMISSIONS TRADES SHOULD BE ALLOWED ONLY WHEN 
THEY COMPLY WITH THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
If industry wants to purchase emissions credits under Rule 
1610 to reduce emissions in other parts of the Los Angeles re-
gion, industry should be allowed to do so only if its local emis-
sions are at an emissions level that comply with the Clean Air 
Act. 179 Rule 1610 states that Mobile Source Emission Reduc-
174. See Challenges Filed to Implerrumtation of SCAQMD Scrapping Rule, 11 CAL. 
ENVTL. INSIDER 5 (1997). Environmental groups are disconcerted by what they see as 
an "aggressively pro-business, anti-environmental" District Governing Board who 
makes the decisions as to how such programs will be implemented. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. See South Coast AQMD, 12 CAL. ENVTL. INSIDER 18 (1998). As a matter of 
fact, the SCAQMD Board called a meeting to devise methods for best ensuring the 
future success of such programs. See id. 
177. See CBE Sues SCAQMD Over Amendments to Car Scrapping Rule, 12 CAL. 
ENVTL. INSIDER 10 (1998). 
178. See David M. Driesen, Trade as a Technique, Not a &ligion, at 1 presented at 
Air Management Advisory Committee Stationary Source Subcommittee New York 
State Department of Environmental Conservation (Jan. 5, 1993). In order to ensure 
the system works, it needs to be properly measured. See id. at 1. 
179. See Driesen, supra note 52, at 310. Driesen states that: 
Id. 
[ilf a buyer of pollution credits produces emissions with strong local health 
effects, for example, cancer-causing hazardous air pollutants, and is distant 
from the seUer of credits, then ethical considerations may preclude allowing 
the buyer to avoid making reductions at her own plant, even if she purchases 
an equal quantity of emissions reduction elsewhere. 
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tion Credits (MSERCs) "may not be [used] toward[ ] compliance 
with federal requirements that do not authorize compliance 
through emissions trading" and the MSERCs value is deter-
mined by the vehicle having at least three years useful re-
maining life prior to scrapping.l80 By forcing the oil companies 
to use Rule 1610 only if their use actually decreases emissions 
everywhere, SCAQMD could begin to decrease the exceSSive 
emissions in the air basin. 181 
In addition, the demand made by environmental justice ad-
vocates, that oil companies comply with the Marine Tank. Ves-
sel Operations Rule 1142 (Rule 1142), is not unreasonable and 
can also serve the companies' best interests. 182 Regions in-
cluding the San Francisco Bay Area, Louisiana and New Jersey 
have successfully installed such equipment. 183 
D. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MUST BE FACTORED INTO 
EMISSIONS TRADING 
In its "Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Sub-
mittal of Implementation Plans," the EPA discussed market-
based incentive programs and provided general implementa-
tion guidelines while considering the different challenges faced 
by each district. l84 SCAQMD ignored the EPA requirements 
180. Los Angeles, Cal., South Coast Air Quality Management District Rule 16IO(a) 
(amended Feb. 12, 1999) (visited April 5, 1999) < http://www.aqmd.gov > (on file with 
author). 
181. See Communities for a Better Env't v. South Coast Air Quality Dist., 
Complaint'll 2 (No. 10R-97-R9) (U.S. EPA filed July 23, 1997). The oil companies' 
previous use of Rule 1610 did nothing to reduce the harmful vapors in the air basin; if 
they were forced to make such trades only when the emissions will actually be reduced, 
SCAQMD will be one step closer to cleaning up the air basin. See id. 
182. See Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82, at 17. The equipment has safety 
incentives such as reducing the risk of fires and explosions. See id. 
183. See Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82, at 17 and fn 18. The article describes a 
study done by the Bay Area Air Quality Management District which "concluded that 
vapor recovery systems 'would have a beneficial impact on tanker safety .... A risk 
analysis done for an oil company ... indicates that controlling these vapors may 
improve safety by as much as eight orders of magnitudes (sic) (100,000,000).'" [d. at n. 
18. 
184. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, App. X (1998): 
The [market-based) [i)ncentive [p)rograms are comprised of several elements 
that, in combination with each other, must insure that the fundamental 
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that market-based incentive programs meet standards of· ac-
countability, enforceability and noninterference with other re-
quirements of the Clean Air Act. 1ss Consequently, as alleged in 
the CBE Title VI administrative complaint, the result is that 
another minority community is burdened with toxic hazards, 
the very harm that environmental justice advocates have been 
working so hard to cease. 186 
The goals of the environmental justice movement and those 
of a market-based system are often in direct conflict. 187 Busi-
nesses want the flexibility to meet their pollution control re-
quirements at the lowest cost possible, while environmental 
justice advocates want to decrease, or eliminate entirely, the 
harmful effects of pollution on minorities. l88 To lessen the con-
flict between the two, SCAQMD should push forward with its 
environmental justice initiatives and the EPA, along with the 
SCAQMD, should ensure that economic goals are not preferred 
at the expense of environmental justice concerns. 189 
principles of any regulatory program (including accountability, enforceability 
and noninterference with other requirements of the Act) are met .... Also it is 
important to emphasize that the effectiveness of an [market-based] incentive 
program is dependent upon the particular area in which it is implemented. No 
two areas face the same air quality circumstances and, therefore, effective 
strategies and programs will differ among areas. 
Id. The EPA further qualifies its statements in the Appendix and states "[b)ecause 
of these considerations, the EPA is not speciJYjng one particular design or type of 
strategy as acceptable for any given EIP .... " Id. Thus, the examples given are 
general in nature to avoid limiting a state's innovation in developing programs 
tailored to individual State needs. See id. 
185. See id. 
186. See id. These goals must be met "in terms of the costs that the design imposes 
upon market transactions and the impact of those costs on market efficiency." Id. 
Furthermore, the EPA contends that in designing emissions trading programs, states 
should evaluate the programs to ensure environmental goals will be met, yet EPA 
makes no mention of health cost considerations. The EPA should include health cost 
considerations and balance them with their economic goals. See id. 
187. See Challenges Filed to Implementation of SCAQMD Scrapping Rule, 11 CAL. 
ENVfL. INSIDER 5 (1997). These struggles are a direct result of the conflicts between 
environmental justice and pollution trading programs. See id. 
188. See Communities for a Better Env't v. South Coast Air Quality Dist., 
Complaint (No. 10R-97-R9) (U.S. EPA filed July 23, 1997). 
189. See SCAQMD Unveils Environmental Justice Initiatives, 11 CAL. ENVfL. 
INSIDER 9 (1997). 
36
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol29/iss3/7
1999] ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 575 
E. FUTURE PROGRESS 
Because of CBE's complaint, the EPA, SCAQMD and the 
California Air Resources Board have been alerted to the envi-
ronmentaljustice issues raised by SCAQMD's use of Rule 1610 
in lieu of Rule 1142.190 In fact, since the filing of both the Clean 
Air Act and Title VI complaints, SCAQMD has attempted to 
address these environmental justice concerns. 191 SCAQMD's 
new chairman asked his staff to investigate several initiatives 
to combat the perception that the SCAQMD has been insensi-
tive to environmental justice considerations. l92 This program 
highlights environmental justice advocates' concerns, including 
problems that have arisen with the oil companies' failure to 
follow Rule 1142.193 
Regardless of the outcome of the pending CBE suits, CBE's 
complaints have already made an impact, as seen in 
SCAQMD's recent efforts. l94 While SCAQMD's environmental 
justice. initiatives are still in their initial stages, SCAQMD's 
efforts are one step toward achieving the balance between eco-
nomic and environmental justice interests. 195 The success of 
the initiatives will be tested when environmental justice advo-
190. See id. 
191. See SCAQMD Unveils Environmental Justice Initiatives, 11 CAL. ENVTL. 
INSIDER 9 (1997). These initiatives include: 
Id. 
Irle-examing AQMD toxics rules to see if they need to be toughened and 
expanded; creating rapid deployment community response teams to 
immediately investigate community emergencies related to airborne 
emissions, starting with concerns in the San Pedro area about port activities; 
creating incentives to clean up or remove diesel engines in the region ... said 
to disproportionately impact low-income communities; reorganizing the 
AQMD's environmental impact reports to comment on projects which may 
create community air pollution and toxic concerns to help cities in their land-
use decision-making; launching a series of town hall meetings through the 
AQMD's four-county jurisdiction to increase residents' access and participation 
in the development of air pollution control programs; and convening a task 
force to investigate local environmental justice concerns, starting with 
concerns about disproportionate risks related to emissions credits trading 
programs, such as those expressed recently by Communities for a Better 
Environment over emissions trading by port oil loading operations. 
192. See id. 
193. See generally Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82. See also supra note 191. 
194. See SCAQMD Unveils Environmental Justice Initiatives, 11 CAL. ENVTL. 
INSIDER 9 (1997). 
195. See id. 
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cates witness SCAQMD's response to polluters who want to use 
emissions trading rules in the future in ways that have dispro-
portionate impacts on minority communities. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although the environmental justice movement has devel-
oped slowly; environmental justice concerns now command 
more attention. l96 The movement still has a long way to go, 
especially in light of the increasing use of market-based sys-
tems that are not designed to consider effects on people. 197 To 
remove all sources of hazardous emissions and all hazardous 
waste sites from every minority community is no doubt imprac-
tical. However, at a minimum, companies should make conces-
sions for health and welfare over simply minimizing costs. 198 
Unless the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the 
South Coast Air Quality Management District factor both eco-
nomic and environmental justice implications into its rules, 
market-based incentives, like emissions trading, should not be 
used at all. l99 Realistically, powerful groups like the Regula-
tory Flexibility Group, who lobbied for the Old-Vehicle Scrap-
ping Rule 1610, will not permit the full-scale elimination of 
emissions trading. Industry, however, must be required to 
weigh the disproportionate impacts of these programs against 
their economic benefits.2OO In addition, in many cases this bal-
ance is best maintained through the current command and con-
trol system framework.201 
The current scheme of emissions trading essentially allows 
industry to buy the right to pollute.202 Viewing pollution trad-
196. See id. 
197. See PERCIVAL, supra note 49, at 190. The authors assert that it is easier to see 
who bears the costs of regulations, than who bears the burden of the problems. See id. 
198. See id. Regulated targets have an incentive to exaggerate costs of complying 
with proposed regulations since industry does not want to comply with the control 
measures, such as installing the marine vapor recovery equipment. See id. 
199. See generally Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 82. The authors also view 
pollution trading as allowing the right to pollute and they assert that they Ufirmly 
believe that no one should be able to 'buy' the right to pollute." [d. at 20. 
200. See id. at 17. 
201. See Driesen, supra note 52, at 311. 
202. See Bansal and Kuhn, supra note 199. 
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ing programs in this light means that industry must merely 
factor the cost of pollution into its overall production costS. 203 If 
companies need only factor in economic pollution penalties, 
environmental justice issues lose force since social conse-
quences are disguised when pollution credits are bought and 
sold.204 When companies are allowed to operate in this manner, 
environmental justice problems will continue and government 
and business response will remain reactive, notproactive. 205 
While the current Title VI lawsuit spurred the South Coast 
Air Quality Management District to create environmental jus-
tice initiatives and the California Air Resources Board to sus-
pend approving credit rules, the future is unclear.206 Only if 
environmental justice advocates, affected communities and 
polluters are all involved in the process can the public be sure 
that environmental justice goals will move closer to realization. 
Rachel Brasso Razon • 
203. See id. 
204. See id. at 20. The authors quote Michael Sandel who sees the purchasing of 
pollution rights as turning pollution into "a commodity to be bought imd sold, 
remov[ing) the social stigma that is properly associated with pollution." Id. 
205. See United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, Toxic Wastes and 
Race Revisited, An Update of the 1987 Report on the Racial and Socioeconomic 
Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites (1994) at 14 (quoting 
Marianne Lavelle and Marcia Coyle, Unequal protection: the racial divide on 
environmental law, NAT. L. J., (Sept. 21, 1993)). Despite the increased awareness of 
environmental justice issues, this updated study shows that the placement of toxic 
waste sites in minority communities has increased. Therefore, one step toward 
decreasing this phenomenon is to prevent siting toxic waste sites in these communities, 
instead of dealing with the effects afterward. See id. 
206. See ARB to Suspend Approval of Credit Rules, 11 CAL. ENVTL. INSIDER 4 
(1997). 
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